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Chapter 5
Main Assumptions for Energy Pathways
Thomas Pregger, Sonja Simon, Tobias Naegler, and Sven Teske
Abstract The aim of this chapter is to make the scenario calculations fully trans-
parent and comprehensible to the scientific community. It provides the scenario 
narratives for the reference case (5.0 °C) as well as for the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C on a 
global and regional basis. Cost projections for all fossil fuels and renewable energy 
technologies until 2050 are provided. Explanations are given for all relevant base 
year data for the modelling and the main input parameters such as GDP, population, 
renewable energy potentials and technology parameters.
Scenario studies cannot predict the future, but they can describe what is needed for a 
successful pathway in terms of technology implementation and investments. Scenarios 
also help us to explore the possible effects of transition processes, such as supply 
costs and emissions. The energy demand and supply scenarios in this study are based 
on information about current energy structures and today’s knowledge of energy 
resources and the costs involved in deploying them. As far as possible, we also take 
into account potential constraints and preferences in each world region. However, this 
remains difficult due to large sub-regional variations. Our energy modelling primarily 
aims to achieve a transparent and consistent scenario, an ambitious but still plausible 
storyline from several possible techno-economic pathways. Knowledge integration 
is the core of this approach because we must consider different technical, 
economic, environmental, and societal factors. The scenario modelling follows a 
hybrid bottom- up/top-down approach, with no cost optimising objective functions. 
The analysis considers the key technologies required for a successful energy transi-
tion, and focuses on the roles and potential of renewable energies. Wind and solar 
energies have the highest economic potential and dominate the pathways on the 
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supply side. However, variable renewable power from wind and photovoltaics (PV) 
remains limited by the need for sufficient secured capacity in energy systems. 
Therefore, we also consider concentrated solar power (CSP) with high-temperature 
heat storage as a solar option that promises large-scale dispatchable and secured 
power generation.
5.1  Scenario Definition
Scenario modelling was performed for three main scenarios that can be related to dif-
ferent overall carbon budgets between 2015 and 2050 and derived mean global tem-
perature increases. The (around) 5.0 °C Scenario was calculated based on the Current 
Policies scenario published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in World 
Energy Outlook 2017 (IEA 2017), and the emission budget for this scenario simply 
uses and extrapolates from the corresponding narratives. The 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C 
Scenarios were calculated in a normative way to achieve defined emission budgets.
5.1.1  The 5.0 °C Scenario (Reference Scenario)
The reference case only takes into account existing international energy and envi-
ronmental policies. Its assumptions include, for example, continuing progress in 
electricity and gas market reforms, the liberalization of cross-border energy trade, 
and recent policies designed to combat environmental pollution. The scenario does 
not include additional policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Because 
the IEA’s projections only extend to 2040, we have extrapolated their key macroeco-
nomic and energy indicators forward to 2050. This provides a baseline for compari-
son with the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios.
5.1.2  The 2.0 °C Scenario
The first alternative scenario aims to achieve an ambitious emissions reduction to 
zero by 2050 and a global energy-related CO2 emissions budget between 2015 and 
2050 of around 590 Gt. The scenario is close to the assumptions and results of the 
Advanced E[R] scenario published in 2015 by Greenpeace (Teske et  al. 2015). 
However, the scenario includes an updated base year, more coherent regional devel-
opments of energy intensities, and reconsidered trajectories and shares of renewable 
energy resource (RES) deployment. The 2.0  °C Scenario represents a far more 
likely pathway than the 1.5 °C Scenario, because the 2.0 °C case takes into account 
unavoidable delays due to political, economic, and societal processes and 
stakeholders.
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5.1.3  The 1.5 °C Scenario
The second alternative scenario aims to achieve a global energy-related CO2 emis-
sion budget of around 450 Gt, accumulated between 2015 and 2050. The 1.5 °C 
Scenario requires immediate action to realize all available options. It is a technical 
pathway, not a political prognosis. It refers to technically possible measures and 
options without taking into account societal risks or barriers. Efficiency and renew-
able potentials must be deployed even more quickly than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. 
Furthermore, avoiding inefficient technologies and behaviours are essential strate-
gies for developing regions in this time period.
5.2  Scenario World Regions and Clusters
The regional implementation of the long-term energy scenarios is defined according 
to the breakdown of the ten world regions of the IEA WEO 2016 (IEA 2016a, b). 
This approach has been chosen because the IEA also provides the most comprehen-
sive global energy statistics and, in contrast to the regional breakdown of the IEA 
WEO 2017, it is also consistent with the Energy [R]evolution study series. Table 5.1 
provides a country breakdown of the ten world regions considered in the scenarios.
Regional conditions play an important role in the layout of the scenario path-
ways. Therefore, scenario building tries to take into account important factors, such 
as current demand and supply structures, RES potentials, urbanization rates, and as 
far as possible, societal and behavioural factors. The following sections provide 
some regional information. Statistical data for the energy systems in the regions can 
be found in Sect. 5.3.
5.2.1  OECD North America
The energy system in OECD North America (USA, Canada, and Mexico) is domi-
nated by developments in the USA, where more than 80% of the region’s demand 
occurs. In the highly developed countries of the USA and Canada, reducing the 
demand for energy by increasing efficiency will play a crucial role in decarbonisa-
tion. However, the high energy intensity (i.e., the high demand per capita or per 
gross domestic product [GDP]) requires even more ambitious measures than in 
other regions to reduce the energy demand as quickly as possible. In Mexico, in 
contrast, increasing living standards and the increasing population will increase the 
difficulties associated with reducing the energy demand, despite ambitious increases 
in efficiency. Wind and solar power generation will be the backbone of the power 
supply in OECD North America. They will be supplemented by hydro power 
(mainly in Canada) and also concentrated solar power (CSP). The high potential for 
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CSP in Mexico and the southern parts of the USA will allow the large-scale use of 
CSP plants for grid balancing and grid stabilization. This will reduce the need for 
power storage, demand-side management, and other balancing strategies. In the 
large metropolitan areas in North America, electromobility and hydrogen cars will 
enter the market earlier and at a faster rate than in many other world regions. Large 
biomass potentials (residues) mean that biofuels could play important roles as 
climate- neutral fuels to bridge the gap until new powertrain technologies dominate 
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the vehicle market. In the heating sector, particularly for process heat, solid biomass 
and biogas will be required as alternative fuels until the (direct or indirect) electrifi-
cation of the heat sector is accomplished.
5.2.2  Latin America
Latin America’s energy system is dominated by Brazil, which accounts for around 
half the region’s energy demand. In the reference (5.0 °C) scenario, this region has a 
particularly high demand for electrification and a strong increase in CO2 emissions 
per capita. Latin America has the highest urbanization rate of all non-OECD regions. 
This provides opportunities for efficiency measures and the large-scale electrification 
of the heat and transport sectors based on renewable resources. Latin America has a 
high overall potential for the use of renewable energies (Herreras Martínez et  al. 
2015) and the largest biomass potential of all regions. It already meets more than 
60% of its power demand from renewable sources, and higher shares are the focus of 
research (Nascimento et al. 2017; Barbosa et al. 2017; Gils et al. 2017). However, in 
many studies, heat and transport demands are not integrated into the assessments, 
even though the region has a large potential for renewable heat and decarbonised 
transport. Given the abundance of biomass, there is potential for generating more 
than 12 EJ from residues (Seidenberger et al. 2008). Biomass will also play a signifi-
cant role in the industry sector. Because the region has a long experience of biofuels, 
they will play a major role in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, especially in Brazil, 
where bioethanol for transport is already competitive (Lora and Andrade 2009; La 
Rovere et al. 2011; Nass et al. 2007). However, the high urbanization rate in Latin 
America means there is also an opportunity to develop electromobility early. In the 
power sector, the use of biomass from residues will help to balance the increasing 
share of variable renewable energy from the excellent solar and wind resources. Grid 
extensions will contribute to inter-regional stability (Nascimento et al. 2017).
5.2.3  OECD Europe
The OECD Europe region includes countries with quite different energy supply 
systems, different potentials for renewable energy sources, and different power and 
heat demand patterns. High solar potentials and low heat demand for buildings are 
characteristic of the south. The northern and western parts of Europe have high wind 
potentials, especially offshore wind. In northern and central Europe, there are high 
potentials for hydropower and a high energy demand for space heating (such as in 
Eastern Europe). Biomass potentials exist predominantly in the north and east, but 
are only limited in the southern regions. The industrial demands for electricity and 
process heat are quite different in highly industrialized countries, such as the 
Scandinavian countries, Germany, and France compared with some eastern and 
southern countries. Most European countries, particularly European Union (EU) 
member countries, already have policies and market mechanisms for the 
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implementation of renewable energy. The European Network of Transmission 
System Operators (ENTSO-E) can be used as a well-established basis for the further 
development of an interconnected European grid, which would be able to imple-
ment the large-scale and long-range transmission of renewable power to demand 
centres. This may also lead to important interconnections to the Middle East/North 
Africa (MENA) region and Eastern Europe/Eurasia. The possible large-scale impor-
tation of solar thermal electricity from MENA countries via high-voltage direct-
current lines has been described in many studies and still represents a promising 
option in the long term, despite the currently difficult political conditions.
5.2.4  Eastern Europe/Eurasia
The Eastern Europe/Eurasia region includes some eastern EU member countries that 
are not part of the OECD, some other countries of the former Yugoslav Republic, and 
several countries of the former Soviet Union. However, the region is dominated by 
the economy and energy system of Russia. The main energy carrier today is natural 
gas, followed by oil. The region has large energy resources in biomass and wind 
power, but also geothermal energy and PV. Eastern Europe/Eurasia is the only world 
region that may face a significant population decline with expected demographic 
developments, particularly in Russia. Today, the region has by far the highest final 
and primary energy demand per $GDP.  This indicates the existence of energy- 
intensive industries, but also large efficiency potentials in all sectors. The high heat 
demand, large rural areas, enormous oil and natural gas potentials, and the uneven 
distribution of economic wealth are some of the major challenges in this region. So 
far, only low expansion rates for renewable energies have been achieved in the region.
5.2.5  The Middle East
The Middle East consists of a series of oil-dependent countries, all of which have 
tremendous solar potential. The transport demand in the Middle East is very high, 
as is the electrification rate in urban areas, where currently almost 70% of the fast- 
growing population lives. Therefore, the electrification of transport systems is a 
major target in our scenarios. For many Middle East countries, water scarcity is a 
problem, and there are opportunities to combine large CSP plants with water 
desalination, to reduce the pressure on water supply systems. Biomass is very 
scarce, so its use must be limited to high-temperature process heat, especially in 
industry, where other renewable sources cannot be used. This will lead to a high 
demand for hydrogen or synthetic fuels. Naturally, this also limits the potential for 
combined heat and power generation (CHP), which is primarily seen as a transi-
tion technology to provide the most efficient use of the remaining fossil fuels and 
low- value biomass wastes. However, because the Middle East has extraordinary 
solar and wind potentials (Nematollahi et al. 2016; Hess 2018), the solar market is 
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taking off. Projects with a capacity of 11 GW are planned for 2018 (MESIA 2018). 
With the extraordinarily high number of full-load hours, there is also the potential 
to use high-temperature solar heat. These resources also provide excellent condi-
tions for hydrogen production, which are extensively exploited in the 2.0 °C and 
the 1.5 °C Scenarios. Therefore, the Middle East is a model solar and hydrogen 
region.
5.2.6  Africa
Africa is a very heterogeneous region, both economically and geographically. One 
of the few things African nations have in common is their very fast population 
growth. Africa includes the arid regions of North Africa, the undeveloped sub- 
Saharan region, and the emerging market of South Africa. North Africa features a 
high electrification rate and a strong dependence on oil. The water and biomass 
potentials for energy are very low, because water and biomass are prioritized for 
nutrition (or at least nutrition competes strongly with energy use). The region has 
outstanding solar irradiation, an excellent renewable energy source. Sub-Saharan 
Africa is characterized by low urbanization and a lack of access to electricity for 
two-thirds of its people (IEA 2014). Its energy supply is characterized by a high 
share of low-efficiency forms of generation, such as traditional biomass use. There 
is a general lack of energy services. Modernizing traditional biomass use could lead 
to significant reductions in energy demand, while maintaining or improving energy 
services (van der Zwaan et al. 2018). A broad variety of renewable energy sources, 
including biomass, hydro, geothermal, solar, and wind, have great potential. 
However, it will be a major challenge to find the investment required to tap these 
power sources under the present economic conditions (van der Zwaan et al. 2018). 
The picture is somewhat different in South Africa, which has a coal-based energy 
system and a comparatively stable and well-connected electricity grid, with access 
to electricity for more than 85% of its population (IEA 2014). The dependence on 
traditional biomass is extensive in the household and commerce sectors. Over 700 
million people rely on fuel wood or charcoal for cooking on inefficient cooking 
stoves or open fires, with an efficiency of 10–20%. Modern biomass technologies 
provide multiple advantages. The introduction of more-efficient technologies, even 
those as simple as improved cooking stoves (with an average efficiency of 25%) or 
biogas stoves (with an average efficiency of 65%) (IEA 2014), will reduce the bio-
mass input and thus the primary energy demand. This will also alleviate the heavy 
pressure on the ecosystem from the unsustainable exploitation of natural forests. 
The introduction of modern technologies will improve the supply of useful energy, 
lower indoor pollution, and improve living standards. Therefore, we assume in our 
scenarios that the overall biomass efficiency will improve from 35% in 2015 to 65% 
in 2050, while biomass’s share will decrease and be partially replaced by electric 
power and solar heat.
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5.2.7  Non-OECD Asia
The Non-OECD Asia region includes all the developing countries of Asia, except 
China and India. This group covers a large spectrum in terms of size, economy, 
stability, and developmental status. The region is spread over a large area from the 
Arabian Sea to the Pacific. Electricity access varies widely in these countries, 
according to WEO 2014. In Southeast Asia, the average access is 77%, with only 
30% access in Myanmar and Cambodia, and nearly 100% access in Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. In Indonesia, there is 76% access (92% in urban areas), in 
Bangladesh 60% (90%), and in Pakistan 69% (88%). In Southeast Asia, 46% of the 
population still relies on traditional biomass, with the highest use in Myanmar 
(93%) and Cambodia (89%). In Indonesia, 42% of the population used biomass for 
cooking in 2012; in Bangladesh the figure was 89%; and in Pakistan, it was 62%. 
The lowest values are in Singapore (0%), Malaysia (0%), and Thailand (24%). The 
scenarios thus cover the whole band-width of renewable resources and technologi-
cal development, even though the outlooks for individual countries deviate widely 
from the average.
5.2.8  India
India has a fast-growing population of over 1.2 billion people and is the world’s 
seventh largest country by area. However, the population density is already 2.7 
times higher than that in China. Due to its climate, India has a rather limited CSP 
potential but a large potential for PV power generation. Its wind power potential is 
expected to be limited by land-use constraints, but the technical potential estimated 
from available meteorological data is large. According to the WEO 2014 database, 
electricity access is on average 75%, with 94% in urban areas and 67% in rural 
areas. In India, about 815 million people still relied on the traditional use of biomass 
for cooking in 2012. Due to population and GDP growth, increasing living stan-
dards, and increasing mobility, it is expected that the energy demand in India will 
increase significantly, although large potentials for efficiency savings exist. 
Electrification is a core strategy for decarbonisation in India, which, combined with 
the rising demand for energy services, will lead to strong growth in the per capita 
and overall electricity demand. It is also expected that the need for mobility in India 
will increase rapidly and more strongly than in other regions of the world.
5.2.9  China
China has great potential renewable energy resources, especially for the generation 
of solar thermal power in the west, onshore wind in the north, and offshore wind in 
the east and southeast. Photovoltaic power generation could play an important role 
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throughout all parts of China. The expansion of hydropower generation is currently 
also seen as a major strategy, but the potential for small hydro systems is rather low. 
China will face further large increases in energy demand in all sectors of the energy 
system. Chinese economic prosperity has mainly been underpinned by coal, which 
provides over two-thirds of China’s primary energy supply today (IEA WEO 2014). 
The increase in electricity use due to higher electrification rates will be a major fac-
tor in the successful expansion of renewable energy in the industry, building, and 
transport sectors. In China, nearly all households are connected to the electricity 
grid. However, according to WEO 2014, about 450 million Chinese still relied on 
the traditional use of biomass for cooking in 2012. China has pledged to reduce CO2 
emissions before 2030, and already has some ambitious political targets for renew-
able energy deployment.
5.2.10  OECD Pacific
OECD Pacific consists of Japan, New Zealand, the peninsula of South Korea, and 
the continent of Australia. The region is dominated by the high energy demand in 
Japan, which has rather limited renewable energy resources. The lack of physical 
grid connections prevents power transmission between these countries. Therefore, it 
is a huge effort to supply the large Japanese nation with renewable energy and to 
stabilize the variable wind power without tapping the large solar potential in other 
countries, such as Australia. Here, hydrogen and synfuels will not only be used for 
the long-term storage of renewable power, but also as an option for balancing the 
renewable energy supply across borders. The early market introduction of fuel-cell 
cars in Japan may support such a strategy. Following the accident at Fukushima and 
the implementation of feed-in tariffs for renewable electricity, the expansion rates 
for renewable energies, in particular PV, have risen sharply.
5.3  Key Assumptions for Scenarios
5.3.1  Population Growth
Population growth is an important driver of energy demand, directly and through its 
impact on economic growth and development. The assumptions made in this study 
up to 2050 are based on United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) projec-
tions for population growth (UNDP 2017 (medium variant)). Table 5.2 shows that 
according to the UNDP, the world’s population is expected to grow by 0.8% per 
year on average over the period 2015–2050. The global population will increase 
from 7.4 billion people in 2015 to nearly 9.8 billion by 2050. The rate of population 
growth will slow over this period, from 1.1% per year during 2015–2020 to 0.6% 
per year during 2040–2050. From a regional perspective, Africa’s population growth 
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will continue to be the most rapid (on average 2.2%/year), followed by the Middle 
East (1.3%/year). In contrast, in China and OECD Pacific, a population decline of 
about 0.1%/year. is expected. The populations in OECD Europe and OECD North 
America are expected to increase slowly through to 2050. The proportion of the 
population living in today’s non-OECD countries will increase from its current 81% 
to 85% in 2050. China’s contribution to the world population will drop from 19% 
today to 15% in 2050. Africa will remain the region with the highest population 
growth, leading to a share of 26% of world population in 2050. Satisfying the energy 
needs of a growing population in the developing regions of the world in an environ-
mentally friendly manner is the fundamental challenge in achieving a sustainable 
global energy supply.
5.3.2  GDP Development
Economic growth is a key driver of energy demand. Since 1971, each 1% increase 
in the global GDP has been accompanied by a 0.6% increase in primary energy 
consumption. Therefore, the decoupling of energy demand and GDP growth is a 
prerequisite for the rapid decarbonisation of the global energy industry. In this 
study, the economic growth in the model regions is measured in GDP, expressed in 
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. Purchasing power parities 
compare the costs in different currencies of fixed baskets of traded and non-traded 
goods and services. GDP PPP is a widely used measure of living standards and is 
independent of currency exchange rates, which might not reflect a currency’s true 
value (purchasing power) within a country. Therefore, GDP PPP is an important 
basis of comparison when analysing the main drivers of energy demand or when 
comparing the energy intensities of countries.
Table 5.2 Population growth projections (in millions)
Million capita 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Change 
2015–2050
OECD North America 482 503 524 543 560 575 588 599 24%
OECD Pacific 207 208 208 208 206 204 201 198 −4%
OECD Europe 570 582 587 592 596 598 599 598 5%
Eastern Europe/
Eurasia
343 346 347 346 345 343 341 339 −1%
Middle East 234 254 276 295 314 331 348 363 56%
Latin America 506 531 552 571 587 599 609 616 22%
China 1405 1433 1447 1450 1442 1426 1403 1374 −2%
Africa 1194 1353 1522 1704 1897 2100 2312 2528 112%
India 1309 1383 1452 1513 1565 1605 1636 1659 27%
Non-OECD Asia 1132 1203 1269 1329 1382 1428 1467 1499 32%
Global 7383 7795 8185 8551 8893 9210 9504 9772 32%
Source: UN World Population Prospects—2017 revision, medium variant
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Although PPP assessments are still relatively imprecise compared with statistics 
based on national incomes, trade, and national price indices, it is argued that they 
provide a better basis for global scenario development. Therefore, all the data on 
economic development in the IEA World Energy Outlook 2016 (WEO 2016a, b) 
refer to purchasing-power-adjusted GDP in international US$ (2015).  However, 
because WEO 2016 only covers the time period up to 2040, projections for 2040–
2050 in the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios are based on German Aerospace 
Center (DLR) estimates, which are mainly used to extrapolate the GDP trends in the 
world regions used in our modelling.
GDP growth in all regions is expected to slow gradually over the coming decades 
(Table 5.3). It is assumed that world GDP will grow on average by 3.2% per year 
over the period 2015–2050. China, India, and Africa are expected to grow faster 
than other regions, followed by the Middle East, Africa, other non-OECD Asia, and 
Latin America. The growth of the Chinese economy will slow as it becomes more 
mature, but it will nonetheless become the economically strongest region in the 
world in PPP terms by 2020. The GDP in OECD Europe and OECD Pacific is 
assumed to grow by 1.3–1.5% per year over the projection period, while economic 
growth in OECD North America is expected to be slightly higher (2.1%). The 
OECD’s share of global PPP- adjusted GDP will decrease from 45% in 2015 to 28% 
in 2050.
Table 5.3 GDP development projections based on average annual growth rates for 2015–2040 









22,123 24,787 27,650 30,513 34,038 37,562 41,675 45,788 107%
OECD 
Pacific
8284 8880 9644 10,407 11,125 11,842 12,462 13,081 58%
OECD 
Europe
21,632 23,883 26,076 28,269 30,538 32,807 34,885 36,963 71%
Eurasia 6397 6757 7919 9081 10,467 11,853 13,439 15,025 135%
Middle 
East
5380 6236 7646 9055 10,853 12,650 14,909 17,167 219%
Latin 
America
7181 7473 8807 10,141 11,951 13,761 16,218 18,675 160%
China 20,179 28,567 37,997 47,427 56,207 64,986 74,906 84,825 320%
Africa 5851 7118 9247 11,376 14,437 17,498 21,950 26,403 351%
India 8021 11,515 17,084 22,652 30,309 37,966 46,020 54,074 574%
Other 
Asia
10,061 11,361 14,577 17,794 21,835 25,876 30,055 34,234 240%
Global 115,108 136,578 166,646 196,715 231,758 266,801 306,519 346,236 201%
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5.3.3  Technology Cost Projections
The parameterization of the models requires many assumptions about the develop-
ment of the particular characteristics of technologies, such as specific investment 
and fuel costs. Therefore, because long-term projections are highly uncertain, we 
must define plausible and transparent assumptions based on background informa-
tion and up-to-date statistical and technical information.
The speed of an energy system transition also depends on overcoming economic 
barriers. These largely relate to the relationships between the costs of renewable 
technologies and their fossil and nuclear counterparts. For our scenarios, the projec-
tion of these costs is vital in making valid comparisons of energy systems. However, 
there have been significant limitations to these projections in the past in relation to 
investment and fuel costs.
In addition, efficiency measures also generate costs which are usually difficult to 
determine depending on technical, structural and economic boundary conditions. In 
the context of this study, we have therefore assumed uniform average costs of 3 ct 
per avoided kWh of electricity consumption in our cost accounting.
During the last decade, fossil fuel prices have seen huge fluctuations. Figure 5.1 
shows oil prices since 1997. After extremely high oil prices in 2012, we are cur-
rently in a low-price phase. Gas prices saw similar development (IEA 2017). 
Therefore, fossil fuel price projections have also seen considerable variations (IEA 
2013, 2017) and have had a considerable influence on scenario results ever since.
Although in the past, oil-exporting countries provided the best oil price projec-
tions, institutional price projections have become increasingly accurate, with the 
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Fig. 5.1 Historic development and projections of oil prices (bottom lines) and historical world oil 
production and projections (top lines) by the IEA according to Wachtmeister et al. (2018)
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An evaluation of the oil price projections of the IEA since 2000 by Wachtmeister 
et  al. (2018) showed that price projections have varied significantly over time. 
Whereas the IEA’s oil production projections seem comparatively accurate, oil price 
projections showed errors of 40–60%, even when made for only 10 years ahead. 
Between 2007 and 2017, the IEA price projections for 2030 varied from $70 to 
$140 per barrel, providing significant uncertainty regarding future costs in the sce-
narios. Despite this limitation, the IEA provides a comprehensive set of price 
 projections. Therefore, we based our scenario assumptions on these projections, as 
described below.
However, because most renewable energy technologies provide energy without 
fuel costs, the projections of investment costs become more important than fuel cost 
projections, and this limits the impact of errors in the fuel price projections. It is 
only for biomass that the cost of feedstock remains a crucial economic factor for 
renewables. Today, these costs range from negative costs for waste wood (based on 
credit for the waste disposal costs avoided), through inexpensive residual materials, 
to comparatively expensive energy crops. Because bioenergy holds significant mar-
ket shares in all sectors in many regions, a detailed assessment of future price pro-
jections is provided below.
Investment cost projections also pose challenges for scenario development. 
Available short-term projections of investment costs depend largely on the data 
available for existing and planned projects. Learning curves are most commonly 
used to assess the future development of investment costs as a function of their 
future installations and markets (McDonald and Schrattenholzer 2001; Rubin et al. 
2015). Therefore, the reliability of cost projections largely depends on the uncer-
tainty of future markets and the availability of historical data.
Fossil technologies provide a large cost data set featuring well-established mar-
kets and large annual installations. They are also mature technologies, where many 
cost reduction potentials have already been exploited.
For renewable technologies, the picture is more mixed. For example, hydro 
power is, like fossil fuels, well established and provides reliable data on investment 
costs. Other technologies, such as PV and wind, are currently experiencing tremen-
dous developments in installation and cost reduction. Solar PV and wind are the 
focus of cost monitoring, and considerable data are already available on existing 
projects. However, their future markets are not easily predicted, as can be seen from 
the evolution of IEA market projections over recent years in the World Energy 
Outlook series (compare for example IEA 2007, 2014, 2017). For PV and wind, 
small differences in cost assumptions will lead to large deviations in the overall 
costs, and cost assumptions must be made with special care. Furthermore, many 
technologies feature only comparably small markets, such as geothermal, modern 
bioenergy applications, and CSP, for which costs are still high and for which future 
markets are insecure. The cost reduction potential is correspondingly high for these 
technologies. This is also true for technologies that might become important in a 
transformed energy system but are not yet widely available. Hydrogen production, 
ocean power, and synthetic fuels might deliver important technology options in the 
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long term after 2040, but their cost reduction potential cannot be assessed with any 
certainty today.
Thus, cost assumptions are a crucial factor in evaluating scenarios. Because costs 
are an external input into the model and are not internally calculated, we assume the 
same progressive cost developments for all scenarios. In the next sections, we pres-
ent a detailed overview of our assumptions for power and renewable heat technolo-
gies, including the investment and fuel costs, and the potential CO2 costs in the 
scenarios.
5.3.3.1  Power and CHP Technologies
The focus of cost calculations in our scenario modelling is the power sector. We 
compared the specific investment costs estimated in previous studies (Teske et al. 
2012, 2015), which were based on a variety of studies, including the European 
Commission-funded NEEDS project (NEEDS 2009), projections from the European 
Renewable Energy Council (Zervos et al. 2010), investment cost projections by the 
IEA (2014), and current cost assumptions by IRENA and IEA (IEA 2016b). We 
found that investment costs generally converged, except for PV. Therefore, for con-
sistency reasons, the investment costs and operation and maintenance costs for the 
power sector are based primarily on the investment costs within WEO 2016 (IEA 
2016b) up to 2040, including their regional disaggregation. We extended the projec-
tions until 2050 based on the trends in the preceding decade.
For renewable power production, we used investment costs from the 450 ppm 
scenario from IEA 2016b. For technologies not distinguished in the IEA report 
(such as geothermal CHP), we used cost assumptions based on our own research, 
from the Energy [R]evolution Scenario 2015 (Teske et al. 2015). As the cost assump-
tions for PV systems by the IEA do not reflect recent cost degressions, we based our 
assumptions on a more recent analysis by Steurer et al. (2018), which projects lower 
investment costs for PV in 2050 than does the IEA. The costs for onshore and off-
shore wind in Europe were adapted from the same source, in order to reflect more 
recent data. The cost assumptions for hydrogen production come from our own 
analysis in the PlanDelyKaD project (Michalski et al. 2017). Table 5.4 summarizes 
the cost trends for power technologies derived from the assumptions discussed 
above for OECD Europe. It is important to note that the cost reductions are, in real-
ity, not a function of time, but of cumulative capacity (production of units), so 
dynamic market development is required to achieve a significant reduction in spe-
cific investment costs. Therefore, we might underestimate the costs of renewables in 
the reference (5.0  °C) scenario compared with the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C Scenarios. 
However, our approach is conservative when we compare the reference scenario 
with the 2.0 °C or 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cost assumptions for the other nine regions 
are in the same range, but differ slightly for different renewable energy technolo-
gies. Fossil fuel power plants have a limited potential for cost reductions because 
they are at an advanced stage of technology and market development. Gas and oil 
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plants are relatively cheap, at around $670/kW and $822/kW, respectively. CHP 
applications and coal plants are more expensive, ranging between $2000/kW and 
$2500/kW. The IEA sees some cost reduction potential for expensive nuclear plants, 
tending towards $4500/kW by 2050, whereas gas might even increase in cost.
In contrast, several renewable technologies have seen considerable cost reduc-
tions over the last decade. This is expected to continue if renewables are deployed 
extensively. Fuel cells are expected to outpace other CHP technologies, with a cost 
reduction potential of more than 75% (from currently high costs). Hydro power and 
biomass remain stable in terms of costs. Tremendous cost reductions are still 
expected for solar energy and offshore wind, even though they have experienced 
significant reductions already. Although CSP might deliver dispatchable power at 
half its current cost in 2050, variable PV costs could drop to 35% of today’s costs. 
Offshore wind could see cost reductions of over 30%, whereas the cost reduction 
potential for onshore wind seems to have been exploited already to a large extent 
(Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 Investment cost assumptions for power generation plants (in $2015/kW) in the scenarios 
until 2050
Investment costs power generation plants in Europe
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
CHP Coal $/kW 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
CHP Gas $/kW 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
CHP Lignite $/kW 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
CHP Oil $/kW 1310 1290 1240 1180 1130
Coal power plant $/kW 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Diesel generator $/kW 900 900 900 900 900
Gas power plant $/kW 670 500 500 500 670
Lignite power plant $/kW 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200
Nuclear power plant $/kW 6600 6000 5100 4500 4500
Oil power plant $/kW 950 930 890 860 820
CHP Biomass $/kW 2550 2500 2450 2350 2250
CHP Fuel cell $/kW 5000 5000 2500 2500 1120
CHP Geothermal $/kW 13,200 11,190 8890 7460 6460
Biomass power plant $/kW 2400 2350 2300 2200 2110
Geothermal power plant $/kW 12,340 2800 2650 2500 2400
Hydro power planta $/kW 2650 2650 2650 2650 2650
Ocean energy power plant $/kW 6950 6650 4400 3100 2110
PV power plant $/kW 1300 980 730 560 470
CSP power plantb $/kW 5700 5000 3700 3050 2740
Wind turbine offshore $/kW 4000 3690 3190 2830 2610
Wind turbine onshore $/kW 1640 1580 1510 1450 1400
Hydrogen production $/kW 1380 1220 920 700 570
aCosts for a system with solar multiple of two and thermal storage for 8 h of turbine operation
bValues apply to both run-of-the-river and reservoir hydro power
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In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, hydrogen is introduced as a substitute for natu-
ral gas, with a significant share after 2030. Hydrogen is assumed to be produced by 
electrolysis. With electrolysers just emerging on larger scale on the markets, they have 
considerable cost reduction potential. Based on the Plan-DelyKaD studies (Michalski 
et al. 2017), we assume that costs could decrease to $570/kW in the long term.
5.3.3.2  Heating Technologies
Assessing the costs in the heating sector is even more ambitious than in the power 
sector. Costs for new installations differ significantly between regions and are inter-
linked with construction costs and industry processes, which are not addressed in 
this study. Moreover, no data are available to allow the comprehensive calculation 
of the costs for existing heating appliances in all regions. Therefore, we concentrate 
on the additional costs resulting from new renewable applications in the heating 
sector.
Our cost assumptions are based on a previous survey of renewable heating tech-
nologies in Europe, which focused on solar collectors, geothermal, heat pumps, and 
biomass applications. Biomass and simple heating systems in the residential sector 
are already mature. However, more-sophisticated technologies, which can provide 
higher shares of heat demand from renewable sources, are still under development 
and rather expensive. Market barriers will slow the further implementation and cost 
reduction of renewable heating systems, especially for heating networks. 
Nevertheless, significant learning rates can be expected if renewable heating is 
increasingly implemented, as projected the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios.
Table 5.5 presents the investment cost assumptions for heating technologies for 
OECD Europe, disaggregated by sector. Geothermal heating displays the same high 
costs in all sectors. In Europe, deep geothermal applications are being developed for 
Table 5.5 Specific investment cost assumptions (in $2015) for heating technologies in the 
scenarios until 2050
Investment costs heat generation plants in OECD Europe
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Geothermal $/kW 2390 2270 2030 1800 1590
Heat pumps $/kW 1790 1740 1640 1540 1450
Biomass heat plants $/kW 600 580 550 510 480
Residential biomass stoves Industrialized countries $/kW 840 810 760 720 680
Residential biomass stoves Developing countries $/kW 110 110 110 110 110
Solar collectors Industry $/kW 850 820 730 650 550
In heat grids $/kW 970 970 970 970 970
Residential $/kW 1060 1010 910 800 680
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heating purposes at investment costs ranging from €500/kWth (shallow) to €3000/
kWth (deep), with the costs strongly dependent on the drilling depth. The cost reduc-
tion potential is assumed to be around 30% by 2050.
Heat pumps typically provide hot water or space heat for heating systems with 
relatively low supply temperatures, or they supplement other heating technologies. 
Therefore, they are currently mainly used for small-scale residential applications. 
Costs currently cover a large band-width and are expected to decrease by only 20% 
to $1450/kW by 2050.
For biomass and solar collectors, we assume significant differences between the 
sectors. There is a broad portfolio of modern technologies for heat production from 
biomass, ranging from small-scale single-room stoves to heating or CHP plants on 
an MW scale. Investment costs show similar variations: simple log-wood stoves can 
be obtained from $100/kW, but more sophisticated automated heating systems that 
cover the whole heat demand of a building are significantly more expensive. Log-
wood or pellet boilers range from $500 to 1300/kW. Large biomass heating systems 
are assumed to reach their cheapest costs in 2050 at around $480/kW for industry. 
For all sectors, we assume a cost reduction of 20% by 2050. In contrast, solar col-
lectors for households are comparatively simple and will become cheap at $680/kW 
by 2050. The costs of simple solar collectors for swimming pools might have been 
optimized already, whereas their integration in large systems is neither technologi-
cally nor economically mature. For larger applications, especially in heat grid sys-
tems, the collectors are large and more sophisticated. Because there is not yet a mass 
market for such grid-connected solar systems, we assume there will be a cost reduc-
tion potential until 2050.
5.3.4  Fuel Cost Projections
5.3.4.1  Fossil Fuels
Although fossil fuel price projections have seen considerable variations, as described 
above, we based our fuel price assumptions up to 2040 on the WEO 2017 (IEA 
2017). Beyond 2040, we extrapolated from the price developments between 2035 
and 2040. Even though these price projections are highly speculative, they provide 
a set of prices consistent to our investment assumptions. Fuel prices for nuclear 
energy are based on the values in the Energy [R]evolution report 2015 (Teske et al. 
2015), corrected by the cumulative inflation rate for the Eurozone of 1.82% between 
2012 and 2015 (Table 5.6).
5 Main Assumptions for Energy Pathways
110
5.3.4.2  Biomass Prices
Biomass prices depend on the quality of the biomass (residues or energy crops) and 
the regional supply and demand. The variability is large. Lamers et al. (2015) found 
a price range of €4–4.8/GJ for forest residues in Europe in 2020, whereas agricul-
tural products might cost €8.5–12/GJ.  Lamers et  al. modelled a range for wood 
pellets from €6/GJ in Malaysia to 8.8€/GJ in Brazil. IRENA modelled a cost supply 
curve on a global level for 2030 (see Fig. 5.2), ranging from $3/GJ for a potential of 
35 EJ/year. up to $8–10/GJ for a potential up to 90–100 EJ/year (IRENA 2014) (and 
up to $17/GJ for an potential extending to 147 EJ).
Table 5.6 Development projections for fossil fuel prices in $2015 (IEA 2017)
Development projections for fossil fuel prices
Reference scenario 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Oil All $/GJ 8.5 12.3 21.5 24.2 35.1
Gas OECD North America $/GJ 2.5 3.3 5.5 6.2 8.9
OECD Europe $/GJ 6.6 7.2 9.2 10.0 12.9
China $/GJ 9.2 9.5 10.3 10.5 11.4
OECD Pacific $/GJ 9.8 10.0 10.7 10.9 11.8
Others $/GJ 2.5 3.3 5.5 6.2 8.9
Coal OECD North America $/GJ 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.0 5.3
OECD Europe $/GJ 2.6 3.1 4.1 4.3 5.3
China $/GJ 3.2 3.5 4.3 4.5 5.3
OECD Pacific $/GJ 2.6 3.3 4.4 4.5 5.3
Others $/GJ 2.9 3.3 4.2 4.4 5.3
Nuclear All $/GJ 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios
Oil all $/GJ 8.5 10.2 12.6 13.0 14.3
Gas OECD North America $/GJ 2.5 2.8 4.5 5.1 7.6
OECD Europe $/GJ 6.6 6.6 8.5 9.4 13.0
China $/GJ 9.2 8.5 9.2 10.0 12.9
OECD Pacific $/GJ 9.8 9.0 9.6 10.3 13.2
Others $/GJ 2.5 2.8 4.5 5.1 7.6
Coal OECD Europe $/GJ 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.4
OECD North America $/GJ 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.7
China $/GJ 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.9
OECD Pacific $/GJ 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.4
Others $/GJ 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.8
Nuclear All $/GJ 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1
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IRENA projected regional supply costs for liquid and other biomass sources in 
2030 based on a global biomass use of around 108 EJ, using current primary bio-
mass prices as a proxy (see Table 5.7). Liquid biofuels demand higher prices because 
of their production and transformation processes; ‘other biomass’ includes primary 
biomass, such as fuel wood, energy crops, and residues.
The prices cited above hold true for modern biomass applications. Traditional 
biomass use is still often based on firewood or other biomass, which is acquired 
without a price (and with the labour cost not considered). No price data are yet 
available for a considerable range of residues. Therefore, the average primary bio-
mass costs across the complete energy system in many regions are lower than the 
available market prices for biomass commodities. Consequently, today’s market 
prices represent the upper limit of today’s biomass costs.
Therefore, for our scenarios, we assumed a lower average biomass price in all 
regions, starting from the lower end of the cost supply curve at around $7.50/GJ for 
OECD regions, with predominantly modern applications. For Africa, Latin America, 
and Asia, including Russia, which have abundant biomass residue potential, current 
prices were assumed to be $3/GJ. For the remaining regions (the Middle East, and 
Eastern Europe), we assumed $5/GJ.
The prices for primary biomass will increase proportionately to the IRENA ref-
erence price for ‘other biomass’ by 2030, following the increasing uptake of modern 
Fig. 5.2 Global supply curve for primary biomass in 2030 (IRENA 2014)
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biomass technologies and increasing trade, representing a further biomass potential 
uptake along the supply curve. For the period until 2050, we consider that biomass 
prices will be stable. The prices calculated by IRENA are valid for a demand of 
108 EJ/year. The biomass demand considered in this study never exceeds a total of 
100 EJ/year. However, the international trade in biomass may heavily influence bio-
mass prices in the future, representing a significant source of uncertainty in our 
assumptions.
5.3.5  CO2 Costs
The WEO 2017 (IEA 2017) considers the future price of CO2 in the power and 
industry sectors. There is considerable variation between the current policy sce-
nario, the new policy scenario, and the 450 ppm scenario, not only in value, but also 
in regional range. Various studies have indicated a close relationship between decar-
bonisation and the implicit or explicit CO2 price (regardless of the most efficient 
implementation measure). On the one hand, the carbon price is a precondition for a 
decarbonisation of the energy sector (Lucena et al. 2016), but on the other hand, 
decarbonisation may limit the costs of CO2 emissions if an efficient pricing measure 
is in place (Jacobson et al. 2017). Because the scenarios in this study rely heavily on 
effective reductions in CO2 emissions, we used the CO2 prices of the 450 ppm sce-
nario in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. In the reference case, we deviated from the 
WEO 2017, which applies rather low CO2 emission costs. Instead, we applied CO2 
costs equivalent to the cost of the resulting climate damage. Based on existing stud-
ies of fossil-energy-induced damage (Anthoff and Tol 2013; Stern et al. 2006), we 
assumed that $78/t of CO2 is a plausible cost estimate in the wide range of estimates 
of the social costs of CO2 emissions (Table 5.8).
Table 5.7 Biomass price projections for 2030 at 108 EJ of the biomass demand (IRENA 2014)
Liquid biofuel reference price Other biomass reference price




North America 34 15
OECD Pacific 61 15
Latin America 59 12
World 42 11
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5.4  Energy Scenario Narratives and Assumptions for World 
Regions
The scenario-building process involves many assumptions and explicit, but also 
implicit, narratives about how future economies and societies, and ultimately energy 
systems, may develop under the overall objective of ‘deep and rapid decarbonisa-
tion’ by 2050. These narratives depend on three main strategic pillars:
• Efficiency improvement and demand reduction: stringent implementation of 
technical and structural efficiency improvements in energy demand and supply. 
These will lead to a continuous reduction in both final and primary energy con-
sumption. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, these measures must be supplemented with 
responsible energy consumption behaviour by the consumer.
• Deployment of renewable energies: massive implementation of new technolo-
gies for the generation of power and heat in all sectors. These will include vari-
able renewable energies from solar and wind, which have experienced 
considerable cost reductions in recent years, but also more expensive technolo-
gies, such as large-scale geothermal and ocean energy, small hydro power, and 
CSP.
• Sector coupling: stringent direct electrification of heating and transport technolo-
gies in order to integrate renewable energy in the most efficient way. Because 
this strategy has its limitations, it will be complemented by the massive use of 
hydrogen (generated by electrolysis) or other synthetic energy carriers.
Some alternative or probably complementary future technical options are explic-
itly excluded from the scenarios. In particular, those options with large uncertainties 
with respect to technical, economic, societal, and environmental risks, such as large 
hydro and nuclear power plants, unsustainable biomass use, carbon capture and 
storage (CCS), and geoengineering, are not considered on the supply side as mitiga-
tion measures or—in the case of hydro—not expanded in the future. The sustainable 
use of biomass will partly substitute for fossil fuels in all energy sectors. However, 
this use will be limited to an annual global energy potential of less than 100 EJ per 
year for sustainability reasons, according to the calculations of Seidenberger et al. 
(2008), Thrän et al. (2011), and Schueler et al. (2013).
The transformations described in the two alternative scenarios are constrained, to 
a certain degree, by current short- to medium-term investment planning, as described 
in the reference case, because most technical and structural options to change the 
demand or supply side require years of planning and construction. This means that 
Table 5.8 CO2 cost assumptions in the scenarios
CO2 costs
2020 2025 2030 2040 2050
Reference All regions $/t CO2 0 42 69 78 78
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C OECD Economies $/t CO2 0 62 87.6 138 189.0
Other regions $/t CO2 0 42 69.5 124 177.5
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both alternative scenarios start deviating significantly from the reference case only 
after 2025. However, some short-term developments shown in the IEA WEO 
Current Policies scenario have been corrected and are not adopted in the alternative 
scenarios because there is newer statistical information (that renders the reference 
development implausible). This is the case for the IEA estimates of demand devel-
opment in some regions and sectors, and it is partly true for investments in fossil- 
fuel- based heat and power generation.
5.4.1  Efficiency and Energy Intensities
It is obvious that a major increase in energy efficiency is the backbone of each ambi-
tious transition scenario, because energy efficiency significantly reduces the need 
for energy conversion and infrastructure investment. The development of the future 
global energy demand is determined by three key factors:
• Population growth, which affects the number of people consuming energy or 
using energy services. Associated with this, increasing access to energy services 
in developing countries and emerging economies is an additional influencing 
factor, bearing in mind that this could mean power grid access or the implemen-
tation of isolated, usually small-scale, local power systems.
• Economic development, which is commonly measured as GDP. In general, GDP 
growth triggers an increase in energy demand, directly via additional industrial 
activities and indirectly via an increase in private consumption arising from the 
higher incomes associated with a prospering economy.
• Energy intensity, which is a measure of how much final energy is required in the 
industrial sector to produce a unit of GDP. Efficiency measures help to reduce 
energy intensity and can result in a decoupling of economic growth and final 
energy consumption. In the ‘Residential and other’ sector, energy intensity refers 
to the per capita demand for final energy (for electrical appliances and heat gen-
eration). Efficiency improvement is also a result of reduced conversion losses, in 
particular those achieved by replacing thermal power generation with renewable 
technologies, which leads to a further reduction in the primary energy intensity.
The reference scenario and both target scenarios are based on the same projec-
tions of population and economic growth. Therefore, the scenarios represent the 
specific, although widely accepted, development of future societies. However, the 
future development of energy intensities differs between the reference and alterna-
tive scenarios, taking into account the different efficiency pathways and therefore 
the successful implementation of measures to intensify required investments in effi-
cient technologies or to change consumer behaviour.
The assumptions made about the potential to further increase the economic and 
technical efficiency in all sectors are based on various external studies. However, 
the lower benchmarks for the assumptions on efficiency potentials are derived from 
the Current Policies scenario of the IEA WEO 2017 (IEA 2017). The upper bench-
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marks for efficiency potentials per world region are taken from Graus et al. (2011), 
Kermeli et al. (2014), and recently published low-energy-demand scenarios devel-
oped by Grubler et al. (2018).
5.4.1.1  Industrial Electricity Demand
‘Industrial electricity demand’ refers to many appliances of different sizes and pur-
poses. Large potentials for saving electricity have been identified in various studies 
in most branches of industry. This particularly applies to electric drives for com-
pressed air, pumps, and fans. The scenario model approach distinguishes between 
electric appliances and power-to-heat devices for space and process heating. The 
consumption of electricity per GDP varies widely between regions, depending on 
their industrial structures and efficiency standards. The trajectories for industrial 
electricity demands are constrained by the abovementioned lower and upper bench-
marks and aim for similar electricity uses per $GDP in the industrial sectors in all 
regions by 2050. The resulting trajectories for OECD and non-OECD countries are 
shown in Table 5.9. The average global electricity demand for electric appliances in 
‘industry’ (without power-to-heat) will decrease from 55 kWh/$1000 GDP in 2015 
to 36 kWh/$1000 in 2050 in the reference case, but to 24 kWh/$1000 in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario and 23 kWh/$1000 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. However, the increased electri-
fication of industrial heat in both alternative scenarios almost cancels out the greater 
efficiency increases in those two scenarios when compared with the reference case. 
The average power-to-heat share in industry will increase in this period from 6% to 
34% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 37% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C 
Scenario, the annual electricity demand for industrial electrical appliances will be 
around 5% lower than in the 2.0 °C Scenario between 2020 and 2025, and up to 
10% lower between 2025 and 2035. However, between 2035 and 2050, the electric-
ity demand for electric appliances in the industry sector converges under the two 
scenarios.
Table 5.9 Assumed average development of specific (per $GDP) electricity use for electrical 
appliances in the ‘Industry’ sector




OECD regions 42.8 40.8 38.2 35.8 33.5 31.5 29.7 28.2 −34%
Non-OECD regions 65.8 62.5 55.7 52.9 48.7 45.7 41.9 39.1 −41%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 42.8 40.4 35.6 32.2 28.7 25.7 23.5 21.7 −49%
Non-OECD regions 65.8 60.9 49.2 42.9 37.2 32.9 28.3 24.8 −62%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 42.8 40.1 33.4 27.4 24.3 22.4 20.7 20.0 −53%
Non-OECD regions 65.8 58.6 46.4 39.8 34.4 30.8 27.4 24.7 −62%
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5.4.1.2  Demand for Fuel to Produce Heat in the Industry Sector
Industrial heat is required for different purposes and at different temperatures. 
Currently, industrial (process) heat is mainly produced by burning fossil fuels. 
Biomass plays a minor role, except in heat use from the combustion of residues and 
biogenic waste. Some low- and medium-temperature heat is produced by co- 
generation plants with combined heat and power provisions. Power-to-heat makes 
up only a small percentage of the industrial energy demand for heat. Regional dif-
ferences in the nature of industry, especially in terms of the presence of energy- 
intensive heavy or manufacturing industries, strongly influence the amounts of 
low-, medium-, and high-temperature heat that must be produced today and in the 
future (because we assume that the regional industry structure will remain the 
same). Various technological improvements, process substitutions, and innovations 
are technically possible and have been implemented to some extent already. An 
important example is highly efficient waste heat recovery. Shorter investment cycles 
and incentives to replace old technologies will help to reduce energy consumption 
as quickly as possible. It is obvious that incentives are essential to trigger rapid 
innovation and the implementation of new technologies. Any political strategy for 
introducing such a pathway requires strong support from various industry stake-
holders and regional or even global governance to overcome the economic and tech-
nical obstacles and conflicting interests. Therefore, both alternative scenarios 
assume that the conditions exist to allow rapid technological change. Table 5.10 
provides the resulting final energy demands for heating per $GDP for OECD and 
non-OECD countries. The average global values will decrease from 680 MJ/$1000 
GDP in 2015 to 366 MJ/$1000 in 2050 in the reference case, and to 185 MJ/$1000 in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and 172 MJ/$1000 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Compared with the 
2.0 °C Scenario, the 1.5 °C Scenario assumes a significantly more rapid reduction 
in the industrial heat demand. Between 2020 and 2025, the annual energy demand 
for heat will be up to 8% lower under the 1.5 °C Scenario than under the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, and up to 17% lower between 2025 and 2035. After 2035, the difference 
will decrease again, and by 2050, it will be around 7%.
Table 5.10 Assumed average development in final energy use for heating in the industry sector 
(including power-to-heat) (per $GDP)
MJ/$1000 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Change 2050/2015
Reference case
OECD regions 406 417 384 352 320 293 270 249 −39%
Non-OECD regions 911 823 687 620 553 506 453 410 −55%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 406 383 330 284 242 207 177 157 −61%
Non-OECD regions 911 791 608 491 381 302 238 196 −79%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 406 377 306 239 199 177 158 143 −65%
Non-OECD regions 911 762 558 428 318 259 212 182 −80%
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5.4.1.3  Electricity Demand in the ‘Residential and Other’ Sector
The electricity demand in the ‘Residential and other’ sector includes electricity use 
in households, for commercial purposes, and in the service and trade sectors, fish-
ery, and agriculture. Besides lighting, information, and communication, a large 
amount of electricity is used for cooking, cooling, and hot water. It has been esti-
mated that in 2015, electricity use for heating had a global average share of 5% of 
the final energy use for heating. It is assumed that this share will increase signifi-
cantly to 30% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 37% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. 
These increases are attributed to sector coupling, the provision of storage for vari-
able renewable energy in the heat sector, and the provision of high-temperature heat 
without fuel combustion. The average global electricity use for appliances in the 
‘Residential and other’ sector will decrease in the reference case from 78 kWh/$1000 
GDP in 2015 to 60 kWh/$1000 in 2050, whereas it will decrease to 38 kWh/$1000 in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 37 kWh/$1000 in the 1.5 °C Scenario, a reduction of 
more than 50% relative to today’s energy consumption. The average global electric-
ity use for appliances in the ‘Residential and other’ sector, which is related to per 
capita consumption, will increase in the reference scenario from 1350 kWh/capita 
in 2015 to 2370 kWh/capita in 2050, whereas it will increase to only 1490 kWh/
capita in the 2.0  °C Scenario and to 1460  kWh/capita in the 1.5  °C Scenario. 
Table 5.11 shows the changes in electricity use for appliances in OECD and non- 
OECD countries (without electricity for heating). Significant reduction potentials 
are assumed for all world regions. Similar to the development in the industry sector, 
between 2020 and 2025, the annual power demand for electrical appliances in the 
‘Residential and other’ sector will be around 5% lower in the 1.5 °C Scenario than 
in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and more than 10% lower between 2025 and 2035. After 
2035, the two scenarios will converge again, so that in 2050, the global demand will 
be only 2% higher in the 2.0 °C Scenario than in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Table 5.11 Assumed average developments of per capita electricity use in the ‘Residential and 
other’ sector for electrical appliances (without power-to-heat)
kWh/capita 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Change 2050/2015
Reference case
OECD regions 4457 4585 4753 4972 5189 5419 5626 5837 31%
Non-OECD regions 712 851 977 1191 1366 1532 1661 1788 151%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 4457 4526 4366 4137 3837 3590 3304 3023 −32%
Non-OECD regions 712 834 894 1004 1083 1143 1193 1238 74%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 4457 4502 4078 3346 2987 2896 2889 2872 −36%
Non-OECD regions 712 806 842 928 1001 1086 1164 1224 72%
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5.4.1.4  Fuel Demand for Heat in the ‘Residential and Other’ Sector
The fuel demand for heat in households has quite different characteristics depend-
ing on the consumption structures in each world region and their climatic condi-
tions. In regions with harsh winters, the heat demand is dominated by the building 
sector (space heat and hot water in private and commercial buildings), but in regions 
with a comparatively warm climate, the demand for space heat is generally low and 
heat is predominantly used for cooking and as low-temperature heat for hot water. 
In the commercial sector, the energy mix for heat is more diverse. The medium- to 
high-temperature process heat demand arises in this sector. Reducing the final 
energy use for heating will involve reducing the demand (e.g., by improving the 
thermal insulation of building envelopes) and replacing inefficient procedures and 
technologies, such as the traditional use of biomass, which is still widely used for 
cooking and heating in some regions. In contrast to traditional biomass, the effi-
ciency of electrical appliances can improve significantly, and they produce zero 
direct emissions and no air pollution. Table 5.12 shows the assumed average final 
energy demand for heating in OECD and non-OECD countries. The average global 
consumption will decrease from 560 MJ/$1000 GDP in 2015 to 280 MJ/$1000 in 
2050 in the reference scenario, but to 173 MJ/$1000 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 
160 MJ/$1000 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The average global per capita energy demand 
for fuels in ‘Residential and other sectors’ will decrease from around 12,600 MJ/
capita per year in 2015 to 11,700 MJ/capita in the reference case. This will mainly 
be due to a shift in the global population shares towards the developing regions. 
Compared with the reference scenario, the energy intensity will decrease to 
7300 MJ/capita in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 6700 MJ/capita in the 1.5 °C Scenario. 
Table 5.12 Assumed average development of specific final energy use for heating in the 
‘Residential and other’ sector (including power-to-heat)






24,932 24,421 24,163 23,980 23,794 23,696 23,821 24,121 −3%
Non-OECD 
regions




24,932 24,282 22,300 20,578 19,064 17,677 16,599 15,800 −37%
Non-OECD 
regions




24,932 24,047 20,413 16,222 15,143 14,538 14,172 13,901 −44%
Non-OECD 
regions
10,047 9549 8593 7515 6737 6234 5808 5510 −45%
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The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes a significantly stronger reduction in demand than the 
2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, additional efficiency measures will reduce 
the final energy demand until 2025 by around 5%, and by up to 13% between 2025 
and 2035 (compared with the 2.0  °C Scenario). Thereafter, the differences will 
become smaller, finally reaching around 8% by 2050.
5.4.1.5  Resulting Energy Intensities by Region
Figure 5.3 shows the final energy intensities related to $GDP for each of the ten 
world regions between 2015 and 2050 and for both alternative scenarios. The final 
energy use per GDP will decrease significantly in all regions, but the decreases will 
be larger (and faster) in OECD countries. This will result in smaller regional differ-
ences in the final energy demand compared with the current situation. Compared 
with the very ambitious assumptions of Grubler et al. (2018) for the specific final 
energy demands in northern and southern world regions, the assumptions made in 
this study are conservative. In Grubler et al. (2018), the annual global final energy 
use, including non-energy consumption, will decrease from 363 EJ in 2015 to 245 
EJ by 2050, whereas in our study, the annual global value will decrease to 310 EJ in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 284 EJ in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with 586 EJ in 
the reference case (see Chap. 8). Because the 1.5 °C target requires a significant 
reduction in emissions before 2030, the 1.5  °C Scenario necessarily reduces the 
energy demand more rapidly than the 2.0 °C Scenario, but only a slightly lower 
annual consumption is assumed in 2050.
5.4.2  RES Deployment for Electricity Generation
The power demand will increase significantly in all scenarios. In the 2.0 °C and 
1.5 °C Scenarios, this will result from the continuous electrification of the heating 
and transport sectors, and the increasing production of synthetic fuels for indirect 

















































Fig. 5.3 Development of the specific final energy use (per $GDP) in all stationary sectors (i.e., 
without transport) per world region under the 2.0 °C Scenario (left) and 1.5 °C Scenario (right)
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power generation and their costs vary from region to region. Therefore, the scenar-
ios follow regionally different strategies and storylines, taking the different regional 
conditions into account on the supply side. The core strategy is the replacement of 
conventional thermal power and heat generators with solar, wind, geothermal, and 
other renewable options for the highly efficient generation of electricity for final 
energy consumption and the generation of synthetic fuels.
Our estimates of the potential for renewable power generation are based on the 
results of the REMix EnDat tool developed (Scholz 2012; Stetter 2014; Pietzcker 
et al. 2014). The technical potentials for solar and wind power in each world region 
were estimated while taking into account the different exclusion criteria and con-
straints documented by Stetter (2014). The analysis was used to estimate the ‘eco-
nomic’ potential for each world region, which is the upper limit of the technological 
expansion under the different scenarios. ‘Economic’ potentials were derived by 
assuming the minimum annual full-load hours for each technology. In the case of 
PV, the assumed global economic potential was estimated to be in the order of 5.4 
million TWh per year. The potential of CSP was even larger, at around 5.6 million 
TWh per year. The annual wind power potentials were estimated to be in the order 
of 500,000 TWh for onshore wind and around 100,000 TWh for offshore wind.
The harvesting of global solar radiation by PVs has enormous economic poten-
tial worldwide. In the last few years, economies of scale have led to a significant 
cost degression for PV modules, and large PV production capacities have been cre-
ated. The PV technology also plays a major role in our scenarios because of its 
decentralized characteristics, which make it easy to build cost-efficient renewable 
power supplies in rural and isolated areas. However, its restriction to sunny hours 
causes high daily and seasonal variability. This results in rather low annual full-load 
hours. Therefore, large quantities of storage capacity must also be installed for 
short-term storage to support the major expansion of PV. The storage options con-
sidered are pumped hydro storage (e.g., by the enhancement of existing hydro sites) 
and a massive expansion of battery storage. This leads to uncertainties in the total 
infrastructure costs for the integration of high shares of PV into the power system 
and the mineral resources required for this. For this reason, the share of PV globally 
remains in the range of about 30% of total power generation, with the highest shares 
in the Middle East (40%), followed by OECD North America and Other Asia (35% 
each). The lowest shares, in the range of 20–25%, are in Eurasia, OECD Europe, 
Latin America, and China.
Wind power on land will achieve an average global generation share of 25% in 
2050 in both alternative scenarios (compared with 8% in the reference case). The 
highest generation shares for onshore wind are assumed in India and Eastern 
Europe/Eurasia, at about 30% each. The lowest shares will be in China, the Middle 
East, and Non-OECD Asia, at 18–23%. For offshore wind, the global generation 
share will rise to 8% by 2050 under both alternative scenarios, compared with only 
1% in the reference scenario. The highest offshore wind shares of 10–15% will be 
achieved under the 2.0  °C Scenario in the OECD regions and Eastern Europe/
Eurasia. The lowest shares are predicted in the Middle East (2%), India (6%), and 
China (6.5%), where the potential is rather limited. The offshore shares under the 
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1.5 °C Scenario will tend to be slightly lower because of the stronger focus on PV 
and onshore wind as the best options for a very rapid expansion of RES.
Compared with PV and wind power, CSP plants promise highly flexible power 
and heat generation, with high capacity factors due to high-temperature heat stor-
age. The use of heat for desalination can also contribute to secure water supplies in 
the sunbelt of the world. We assume that its multi-purpose uses and dispatchable 
generation capability can lead to a significant role for CSP in the medium- to long- 
term future, although levelized costs of CSP are today still much higher than they 
are for PV or wind, and investment costs for batteries for short-term electricity stor-
age might also decrease in the future. Therefore, it is assumed that CSP will achieve 
an average global electricity generation share of 15% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
and 13% in the 1.5 °C Scenario, compared with 0.5% in the reference case. A high 
share, close to 30%, will be achieved, especially in the Middle East. This will 
include electricity generation for export to OECD Europe of up to 120 TWh per 
year by 2050. High CSP potentials are also assumed for Africa (16%), which will 
also export up to 280 TWh/year in 2050 from North Africa to OECD Europe—and 
for China (18–20%) and Non-OECD Asia (15–17%).
Hydro power generation will increase only moderately under the alternative sce-
narios compared with the reference case. This source has already been tapped and 
large hydro plants usually have significant ecological and societal consequences. 
Therefore, the average global power generation share will decrease in the alterna-
tive scenarios from today’s 16% to around 8%, whereas the reference scenario 
assumes a generation share of 14% in 2050. Nevertheless, a 30% increase in the 
global hydro power generation is assumed between 2015 and 2050. The highest 
power generation shares in 2050 are assumed to be in Latin America (24%), fol-
lowed by OECD Europe (11%) and China (10%). The generation of hydro power 
plays only a minor role in the long term in the Middle East (1%), Africa, and India 
(each 4%).
Even smaller contributions are assumed for geothermal energy, ocean energy, 
and biomass. All three options have comparably high power-generation costs, but 
offer complementary characteristics and availabilities that may stabilize future elec-
tricity supply systems. The global average share of geothermal power generation is 
assumed to be about 5% in 2050, ocean energy use will contribute another 2%, and 
biomass, including co-generation, will achieve a maximum of 6–7% around 2030 
and 5% in 2050. The highest share for geothermal power generation is assumed to 
occur in Eastern Europe/Eurasia (11%), for ocean energy in OECD Pacific (4%), 
and for biomass use in Latin America, Eastern Europe/Eurasia, and OECD Europe 
(8–9%). It is predicted that hydrogen will take an increasing share of the remaining 
thermal power generation, as a substitute for natural gas in gas turbines and com-
bined cycle gas turbine plants and with increasing contributions from hydrogen fuel 
cells to co-generation. Figure 5.4 shows the basic storyline in global power genera-
tion under the 2.0 °C Scenario.
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5.4.3  RES Deployment for Heat Generation
Heat generation covers a broad range of processes, including district heat (either 
from co-generation or public heating plants), direct heating in buildings, and pro-
cess heat in industry, commerce, and other sectors. Different technologies are con-
sidered for each sector, and strong RES expansion is assumed. The increasing heat 
extraction from co-generation will trigger increasing district heat use, which will 
stabilizes in the long term or decrease by 2050 with the declining heat demand 
attributable to ambitious efficiency measures. However, CHP will only contribute 
significantly in regions with a tradition of district heating and/or a high heat demand 
in the building sector. No strong expansion of heat grids is assumed in regions with-
out existing heat grids and a low demand for space heat.
Electricity for heating is assumed to play a significant role in future energy sys-
tems. In contrast to today’s technology, flexible use is assumed, adjusted to variable 
feed-ins from variable renewable generation. This implies the availability of heat 
storages, smart operation controls, and flexible electricity tariffs. Electricity can be 
used with relatively low investment for space heating and is therefore easily com-
bined with other heating technologies. For example, simple electric heaters can eas-
ily be integrated into heat storage or heating grids. However, more-efficient electric 
heat pumps generally require higher investment in both the heat pump itself and in 
the heat distribution within the building. Electricity can also be used to provide 
process heat in industry at high-temperature levels. The alternative scenarios glob-
ally assume a significant increase in the average electricity share of the final energy 
for heating in ‘Industry’ from 6% in 2015 to around 34% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
37% in the 1.5 °C Scenario by 2050. All regions achieve shares of between 23% and 
43%. Electricity shares in the ‘Residential and other’ sector are assumed to grow 


























Fig. 5.4 Development of the average global RES shares in total power generation in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario
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However, the need for process heat at high temperature levels, problems associ-
ated with process integration, and specific process requirements call for additional 
process-specific strategies for replacing fossil fuels in the industry sector. As men-
tioned above, electrification is a comparatively efficient strategy. Other strategies 
are the use of biomass and hydrogen or—with some limitations—concentrated solar 
energy. While hydrogen is used to provide high temperature process heat in this 
study, it could—at least partially—be replaced by other synthetic energy carriers, 
such as synthetic methane, which can be generated from hydrogen and a (renew-
able) carbon source. This power-to-gas option has the advantage that it can be fed in 
into the gas grid, and act in storage and transport. However, energy losses are around 
20% higher (compared with hydrogen). As a consequence, synthetic methane is not 
taken into account in the scenarios.
Overall, biomass use for heating in the ‘Residential and other’ sector is decreas-
ing as the traditional and currently inefficient use of biomass is replaced by advanced 
efficient technologies, and biomass is used in a more efficient way in the energy 
system. Thus, the average global share of biomass as a final energy source for heat-
ing will decrease from today’s 34% to 22% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 
17% in the 1.5 °C Scenario, when direct electrification and indirect electrification 
(via synthetic gases and fuels) play a stronger role. In contrast, biomass use in the 
‘Industry’ sector will increase continuously as the combustion of biomass can be 
used to generate high-temperature heat for many industrial processes for which 
renewable low-temperature heat sources are unsuitable. The average global share of 
biomass for the final energy for heating in the ‘Industry’ sector will increase from 
9% in 2015 to 19% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 14% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. 
The largest shares are assumed for Latin America (47%) and Africa (35%) in the 
2.0 °C Scenario, where biomass residues are still rather abundant, with much lower 
values for the 1.5 °C Scenario (18–21%). In that scenario, biomass as a transition 
technology will be avoided due to the earlier development of alternative renewable 
technologies and electrification. The lowest shares are assumed for the Middle East 
(4%) and China (7%) in both alternative scenarios because of their limited sustain-
able potentials.
Solar collectors are suitable for hot water preparation and for supporting heating 
systems using heat storage. In heat grids, large heat storage systems can also be used 
to balance the seasonal heat demand and solar generation, and the integration of 
solar heat at low costs in the long term. The contributions of solar collectors to the 
heat supply are limited by the temperatures that collectors can provide (below 
120 °C for traditional collectors and up to 300 °C for concentrated collectors) and 
the seasonal variations in regions with significant space heat demand. In the alterna-
tive scenarios, the global average share of solar thermal final energy for heating will 
rise to 19% in the ‘Residential and other’ sector. The largest shares are assumed to 
be in the Middle East (30–25%), where the abundance of solar radiation can be 
exploited by concentrated solar heat applications. All other regions have shares 
between 15% and 22%, considering the limited applicability of concentrated sys-
tems. The global average solar share in the ‘Industry’ sector will increase to 16% by 
2050. The largest shares are achieved in the Middle East (25%) and Africa (20%) 
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and the lowest shares are assumed in Eastern Europe/Eurasia (9%), followed by the 
OECD regions (10–13%).
Heat pumps allow very efficient heat supply. System-wide CO2 emissions depend 
on the CO2 emissions in the power mix. Because of their generation of low- 
temperature heat, heat pumps play a role in space heating in regions with moderate 
or cold climates, but large industrial heat pumps can also generate low-temperature 
heat for industrial processes and tap the enormous potential of waste heat. A con-
tinuous improvement in the coefficient of performance of heat pumps, which 
describes the ratio of useful energy in the form of heat to the required compressor 
energy in the form of electricity, in all existing plants from an average of 3 today to 
a value of 4 in 2050 is assumed. The application potential of heat pumps (in terms 
of MWth) is assumed to be limited by the low temperature of the heat provided, the 
increasing share of the grid-connected heat supply, the assumed increase in exten-
sive building insulation, and the low space heating demand in some world regions. 
In addition to heat pumps, an increase in deep geothermal energy use is assumed for 
the ‘Industry’ sector, with an increase of up to 11% in the global average share of 
final energy by 2050 under both alternative scenarios.
Hydrogen use for direct heating is linked to the increasing substitution of natural 
gas with hydrogen in all sectors, except transport. This will lead to a hydrogen share 
of 12–14% in final energy for heating in the ‘Industry’ sector under the two alterna-
tive scenarios and 3% in the ‘Residential and other’ sector under the 2.0 °C Scenario 
and 4% under the 1.5 °C Scenario. The highest hydrogen shares in ‘Industry’ are 
assumed for OECD North America (22–23%), followed by other OECD regions, 
Eastern Europe/Eurasia, China, and the Middle East with shares of 13%–18%. The 
lowest shares, below 5%, are assumed for Latin America and Africa, where biomass 
from residues provides a flexible alternative. The highest hydrogen shares in the 
‘Residential and other’ sector will be in the Middle East (7–10%), followed by 






















Fig. 5.5 Development of the average global RES shares of future heat generation options in 
‘Industry’ in the 2.0 °C scenario
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5.4.4  Co-generation of Heat and Power and District Heating
Compared with condensing power plants with high efficiency losses due to waste 
heat, the co-generation of heat and power (combined heat and power, CHP) allows 
the highly efficient use of fossil and renewable fuels. If this approach is made more 
flexible with the help of heat storage, and if it is powered by renewable fuels, such 
as biomass or hydrogen from renewable electricity, CHP promises to generate not 
only renewable power in a flexible way but also to integrate efficiently large shares 
of renewable heat into energy systems via large and small district heating systems. 
Therefore, co-generation is a particularly good option in regions with high low- to 
medium-temperature heat demands (e.g., industrial consumers and space heating). 
Our modelling distinguishes between public generation in large CHP plants and 
CHP autoproduction. The latter comprises industrial CHP generators but also 
smaller plants in the ‘Residential and other’ sector. Power-to-heat ratios, efficien-
cies, and assumed costs reflect these different structural options. The IEA Energy 
Balances provides statistical values with which to calibrate the co-generation for 
each world region. The scenarios then assume the similar development of these 
parameters according to a defined advanced state of technology, with overall effi-
ciencies of 85–90%.
Although absolute electricity generation from CHP will increase in all regions, 






















Fig. 5.6 Development of the average global shares of future heat-generation options in the 
‘Residential and other’ sector under the 2.0 °C scenario
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due to the decommissioning of fossil-fuel generators, the limited availability of bio-
mass, and the assumption that heat losses in CHP technologies will be reduced, 
leading to higher overall efficiency. Tables 5.13 and 5.14 show the resulting devel-
opments for power and heat as intensities summed across the ‘Industry’ and 
‘Residential and other’ sectors. Whereas the absolute power supply from CHP will 
increase in all regions, the power-related intensities will decrease. Under the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, higher CHP power production is assumed to be higher than in the refer-
ence case, as a balancing option for variable renewable sources. CHP plants will 
play a smaller role in the future, particularly in non-OECD countries.
For heat, the situations are more diverse between the scenarios and regions. 
While the intensity of heat use from CHP will increase in the OECD regions, it will 
decrease in the non-OECD regions. Even though the intensity converges between 
OECD and non-OECD regions under all scenarios, the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios 
will achieve higher levels of intensity. However, the early reduction in demand in 
the 1.5 °C Scenario will preclude any additional demand for CHP.
Table 5.13 Development of power from co-generation per $GDP




OECD regions 18.8 17.4 15.9 14.3 13.0 12.1 11.3 10.7 −43%
Non-OECD regions 34.0 28.7 23.1 19.3 16.3 14.1 12.1 10.7 −69%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 18.8 18.0 18.8 18.8 18.1 16.7 15.1 13.6 −28%
Non-OECD regions 34.0 29.4 25.9 23.5 20.9 18.6 16.3 14.3 −58%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 18.8 18.0 18.1 17.7 16.6 15.3 13.8 12.4 −34%
Non-OECD regions 34.0 29.4 25.9 23.5 20.8 18.7 16.3 14.2 −58%
Table 5.14 Development of heat from co-generation per $GDP




OECD regions 39.5 39.7 38.8 39.4 40.2 41.8 43.6 47.2 19%
Non-OECD regions 108.8 94.8 78.3 67.9 60.0 54.8 50.1 47.9 −56%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 39.5 40.5 49.3 58.1 65.2 70.1 75.2 78.4 98%
Non-OECD regions 108.8 101.2 92.6 89.8 86.3 83.4 77.6 70.4 −35%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 39.5 41.0 51.9 58.4 60.4 61.6 63.8 66.0 67%
Non-OECD regions 108.8 101.1 93.8 93.3 89.8 84.5 77.9 69.9 −36%
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5.4.5  Other Assumptions for Stationary Processes
Although the energy losses in the production of synthetic fuels are significant, these 
fuels are expected to be mandatory in the deep decarbonisation scenarios for sectors 
and processes in which the direct use of other renewable sources, including renew-
able power, is not technically feasible. We assume an optimistic increase in the 
efficiency1 of electrolytic hydrogen generation, from 66% today to 77% by 2050 
(ratio of energy output [H2] to energy input [electricity]). The generation of syn-
thetic fuels (such as Fischer-Tropsch fuels) from hydrogen, using CO2 as the carbon 
source, is assumed to be a complementary option that will allow the decarbonisation 
of long-range transport, particularly aviation and international bunkers, without 
exceeding the defined maximum sustainable biomass use. Therefore, the assumed 
shares of power-to-liquid synfuels in the aggregated biofuel/synfuel fraction of all 
transport modes (according to Sect. 6.3.3.) is a result of the sectoral allocation of the 
limited biomass potentials in each world region. The assumed efficiency2 of synfuel 
generation will increase from 35% in 2020 to 42% in 2050. As well as in fuel-cell 
vehicles, hydrogen can be used to replace natural gas in stationary processes by 
2030  in both scenarios, mostly for use in industry and co-generation plants. The 
scenarios do not assume a hydrogen economy in the long term. The development of 
hydrogen infrastructure is expected to be inefficient, especially for residential use. 
However, because hydrogen is assumed to be fed into the gas grid with a share of up 
to 100% by 2050, it will also be partly used in the ‘Residential and other’ sector, 
which includes various commercial applications.
The allocation of the limited biomass to the power, heat, and transport sectors 
differs significantly between the available scenarios. In this study, the biomass in the 
alternative scenarios is mainly for use in transport, co-generation, and industry. 
Traditional biomass use is strongly reduced, but biomass remains an important pil-
lar of heat supply in the ‘Residential and other’ sector under the assumption that the 
most-efficient technologies are implemented. Biofuel production for transportation 
remains limited. An increase in overall efficiency of up to 75% is assumed, implying 
the use of residues for heat and power generation.
The efficiency of fossil technologies will also increase, especially for gas power 
plants. This goes along with the decreasing utilization rates that result from the vari-
able feed-in from renewable energies. Therefore, the scenarios implicitly assume 
that the future innovations in all combustion technologies will focus on maximum 
efficiency at lower utilization rates. Gas power plants will be used for backup, 
requiring low investment but providing high flexibility to the power system. 
Therefore, a part of the energy transition is the rapid replacement of inflexible 
medium- to base-load power plant capacities with flexible gas power plants.
1 Ratio energy output (H2) to energy input (electricity)
2 Ratio of energy output (synfuels) to energy input (electricity).
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